In this paper a game theoretic model is used to extend information value theory, as developed in decision analysis, to competitive situations. One of the main differences between competitive and noncompetitive situations is that part of the environment (namely the competitors) may be modified as a result of experimentation in another part of the environment (nature). Hence, states of the world and actions may no more be independent. Nevertheless, we shall show how the classical concept may be generalized to cover competitive situations.
Introduction
The concept of the value of information is one of the cornerstones of decision analysis [1] , [2] , [7] . It is intended to be a guide for the research and development of new strategies; in particular, for strategies which would allow for the gathering of new information on the real state of nature. However, in competitive situations such strategies may induce a-change in the behavior of the competitors if these become aware of the experimentation. Then information usage is likely to become more complicated since a strategy used by the informed competitor may be used as a "second stage" experiment on nature by the uninformed competitors. So, for the decision maker who is interested in the value of an experiment which implies a modification of his behavior as perceived by competitors, strategies and states of nature (which include the competitors' strategies), may no longer be considered as independent as usually assumed in decision theory.
The present paper analyzes competitive situations in which individual experimentation is performed with full knowledge of the competitors though the outcome is known only to the experimenter. The analysis is based on a general game theoretic model developed by Harsanyi [1] . Since this paper is rather conceptual, it deals mainly with interpretations and discussions, relying on other papers for basic mathematical proofs [4] , [6] .
In ?2 we shall define the concept of the value of information as used in decision analysis. In ?3 we shall show how the concept may be extended to strictly competitive situations. This will be illustrated by means of an example in ?4. In the last section some further remarks will be discussed including a nonstrictly competitive situation in which the value of information is negative.
The Value of Information Revisited
Consider the following classical decision problem under uncertainty: select an action among a finite set of feasible actions A = {a}, given a finite set of possible events or states of nature, = { e}, a probability distribution on the events po ( The expected value of information is generally interpreted as the maximal amount at which one would be willing to buy the experiment.
In the remainder of this section we shall state a simple property suggested by (2. finite). Let po E P be the a priori probability distribution on E and the experiment I? = {i, j} be defined by two possible a posteriori probability distributions on E, Pi E P and pi E P, with marginal probabilities -yi and yj respectively (recall that for consistency we have yip + yjpj = po). Then the information value analysis is completely described by the following graph. Since the function iu( ) is convex it may appear that the technical apparatus developed so far is unduly complicated. However, as we shall now show, it will turn out to be particularily well suited for the study of competitive situations.
Sequential Strictly Competitive Situations
In this section, we shall generalize the concept of the value of information, as recalled in ?2, to the simplest form of competition; that is, the constant sum case.
Let the two competitors be competitor 1 and competitor 2, 1 selecting an action from A, and 2 from B = {b}. For any event, e E E, we assume that the two competitors' payoffs, which are now defined on A x B x E, add up to some constant c(e), independently of the selected actions. We assume that the two competitors move sequentially, 1 moving first; that is, 1 selects some action a which is revealed to 2, and then 2 selects some action b, both decision makers being uncertain about the event e which will prevail but having the same probability distribution on E. Suppose that 1 and 2, the two competitors, have to set a price, a E A for 1 and b E B for 2, for a new product. Moreover, suppose that the size of the market, e E E, is uncertain. Suppose also that 1 is the price leader so that 2 will wait until 1 has set up his price.
Assume that the payoff tables appear as follows: (i) In case of a bad market, the benefits would add up to 6 and, depending on the prices set, would be shared such that: 2 There are certainly other ways to define the value of information in competitive situations. This specific assumption is particularly well suited in the context of game theory since it keeps the situation as a game with complete information; that is, both players know how much is known by the other one.
(ii) In case of a good market, the figures would add up to 9 and be such that: If there were no uncertainties, then the two competitors would sequentially set a high price (H) in case of a bad market and a low price (L) in case of a good market.
If they are uncertain about the market, then the prices to be set will depend on the probability distribution over E. These optimal prices and the associated payoff to I are depicted on .One can see that if the probability of a bad market is less than 1/2 competitor 1 should set a low price, and if it is greater than 1/2 he should set a high price. Competitor 2 would follow competitor l's price if the probability of a bad market is less than 1/5 or greater than 3/4. Between these two values competitor 2 would set the opposite price of competitor 1. Intuitively if the uncertainties are high, competitor 2 has much more to gain by taking a bold risk than by being a follower (foi instance, suppose 1 sets a low price in the expectation of a good market, by setting a high price 2 may loose one unit if l's expectation turns out to be wrong). We shall concentrate our analysis in the case of high uncertainties (1/5 < p < 3/4).
Suppose now that competitor 1 may order a market study and thus obtain perfect information while competitor 2 would only know the potential outcomes of the market study and remain uncertain about which specific one obtained. What would be the value of this market study? Intuitively again, if competitor 2 knows that competitor 1 knows the size of the market, he should be far less willing to take a bold risk and may very well fall back on a follower attitude. But this is not so simple since if competitor 1 could expect a follower attitude, he could exploit competitor 2's belief by reversing his choices (set a high price in a good market, and get 7 units, and a low price in a bad market, and get 5 units). Now, if competitor 2 could expect that competitor 1 expects a follower attitude, he could exploit competitor l's belief .... Clearly, the inconsistency in this succession of mutual expectations may only be resolved using randomization. This is confirmed by the game theoretical analysis which we shall now present and interpret.
The value of information to competitor ] and how to get it.
Assume that p = 1/2, then from a theoretical standpoint we know that, In order to understand this we shall introduce an intermediary step. Assume that perfect information is not available to competitor 1 but that the following experiment is available, Io = {i,j} such that pi = 1/5 and pj = 3/4 with respective marginal probabilities yi =5/11 and yj =6/11. Moreover assume that the outcome of the experiment will be made public to both competitors. Note that at the pointspi andpj, competitor 2 is completely indifferent between setting a high or a low price. Then, the value of this public experiment to competitor 1 is 5/11 u(1I/5) + 6/11 iu(3/4) -ui(1/2).
If competitor 1 could privately buy the experiment Io he always has the option to make the outcome public so that The effect of this strategy is to make competitor 1 indifferent between which price to set whatever the market is (for instance if the market is good, competitor 1's expectations are 5 * (4/11) + 6 * (7/11) = (62/11) in case of low price, and 4 -(5/11) + 7 * (6/11) = (62/11) in case of a high price). Consequently it is not only a Bayesian best reply for competitor 2, since it optimizes 2's expected payoff conditional on competitor 1's price, but it is a reinforcement for competitor 1's own randomization. In terms of expected payoff we finally obtain EVPI(po) = EVI(po I IO). If we note that the experiment Io is indeed the experiment whose public value is the highest for competitor 1, this gives an interesting interpretation to Proposition 3.1.
Further Remarks on the Value of Information
It is sometimes suggested that the value of information in a competitive situation benefits from two components: (i) the very use of information such as in a classical decision problem under uncertainty (there are more strategies available with than without information), (ii) the simple fact that the opponent believes that one has perfect information (some of these new strategies may be used only as threats).
In this section we shall first present a specific interpretation of this general statement in the context of our case study. Then, we shall show by means of another example that this second component of the value of information may turn out to be disadvantageous for the competitor who receives information, so that altogether the value of information may be negative.
The case revisited.
Assume now that competitor 1 will have perfect information with probability q (O < q < 1), and that with probability 1 -q he will remain uncertain, just as competitor 2. As usual, assume that competitor 2 knows that much. What is the value of such For p = 1/2, the analysis is summarized in Figure 3 : the EVI associated with this new experiment as a function of q (O < q < 1). Note that as long as q remains greater or equal to 6/1 1, the EVI remains constant; as long as competitor 2 believes competitor 1 has perfect information with a high enough probability q > q inf (in this example q inf = 6/11), this is enough to ensure the maximal benefit from the information. As a matter of fact, in many strictly competitive situations this probability will turn out to be surprisingly small, thus giving much credit to the second point of the statement mentioned at the beginning of this section.
A nonstrictly competitive situation.
Information usage may be much more complicated in nonstrictly than in strictly competitive situations. Our goal here is simply to show by means of an example that some of the new strategies available with information may represent sufficient threat to deter the opponent, to make him change his own behavior and all together to turn out to generate a negative value to the competitor having information (for more examples see [4] ).
Indeed suppose that competitors 1 and 2 may engage in a mutually advantageous lottery in the following way: (i) a fair coin is tossed and not shown to the competitors, (ii) competitor 1 announces heads or tails, (iii) competitor 2, knowing competitor l's announcement, may engage the two of them in the lottery by saying the reverse, in which case the competitor who is correct would receive four units and the other one zero, or refuse the lottery by saying the same thing as competitor 1, in which case both competitors would receive one unit each, irrespectively of which side of the coin prevails.
Since the expectation of the lottery is, 4 * (1/2) + 0 * (1/2) = 2, the second competitor should engage both of them in the bet; that is, say heads if the first one says tails and vice versa. Competitor 1 may indifferently say heads or tails so that both of them have an expectation of two units. In this context, what is the value to competitor 1 if it is privately revealed to him on which side the coin fell? Clearly, if competitor 2 knows that competitor 1 knows, and if side payments are not allowed, the lottery is no longer fair. It is a dominating strategy for competitor 1 to announce the true state of the coin since if the lottery is played he receives four units for sure and if it is not played, it does not matter what he says. Consequently, competitor 2 should of course refuse to play the lottery so that finally both of them have now an expectation of one unit! Thus, the value of this private information to competitor 1 is minus one unit.
Discussion and Summary
In this paper we have been interested in investigating the value of information in a competitive environment. It was assumed that if the decision maker could acquire some information, then his competitor would know that experimentation took place though he would ignore the specific outcome of the experiment. Moreover it was assumed that the competitor would especially be aware of the acquisition of information because he could observe the decision maker's eventual change of behavior. Admittedly the analysis of such real situations would be quite complicated. The objective of the paper has merely been to present a game model of such situations in the hope that its analysis could offer some practical insights. Our main findings for strictly competitive situations may be summarized as follows:
(i) The decision maker who makes the experimentation should plan that his competitor will learn, but, since he is the one who gets the information, he can control his learning to his own advantage.
(ii) In our model this controlled learning results in the fact that the value of perfect private information is equal to the value of the public experiment which would be the most profitable for the decision maker.
(iii) This public experiment will ordinarily be an imperfect experiment because in a competitive environment uncertainty need not be disadvantageous (i.e. the payoff function may not be convex in terms of the uncertainties).
(iv) The control of the competitor's learning derived so as to keep the benefit of the uncertainties may be difficult since it could theoretically involve bluffing, the practice of which is somewhat risky.
As for nonstrictly competitive situations, no general statement could be made. Indeed an example is provided in which the value of information is in fact negative.
